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BOOK REVIEWS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT. By Kenneth C. Davis. St. Paul, West Publish-
ing Company, 1959. Pp. xiv, 617. $8.00.
In this rather slim volume, when measured by law-book standards,
Professor Davis has made available specifically to law students most of the
text of his four-volume Treatise on Administrative Law.' In an effort to
retain the depth of the discussion in the Treatise, its content has been
substantially preserved; but certain amplifying passages have been omitted.
Aside from the omissions, economy of bulk has been achieved through the
use of a two-column format, characteristic of the publishers' contemporary
Hornbook Series, and the reduction of footnote citations to a minimum.
Occasionally the text is altered to take account of a development that
followed publication of the Treatise.2 Chapter and section designations are
the same in the two works, so that the reader of the shorter one may readily
refer to the longer work for additional citations and occasionally for
additional illustrative text. The result is highly readable, with only occasional
internal evidence that the discussion has been truncated at points.
The author's theory, expressed in the preface, is that law students do
not want or need simplified exposition but, rather, desire full discussion,
including "spirited criticism of the authorities," so as to "spark their own
imagination" and provide the foundation for them to formulate "their own
opinions on major issues." This theory is sound. Not spoon-feeding of
over-simplified ideas, but guidance and challenges to thought are surely the
due of students at the graduate professional level. Given the right kind of
teaching, even the less brilliant ones are not likely to succumb without
adequate thought to the lure of the author's ideas, ably stated.
In both the Treatise and the Text, Professor Davis writes expressively,
using predominantly short sentences and sometimes rather graphic or homely
language. Thus on page 6 the "purple hues of economic royalists" are
referred to. On page 19 a mythical "Mr. Practitioner" is introduced as the
medium for expressing conventional ideas about administrative law. On page
53 constitutional principles relating to the administrative power of investi-
gation are said to have been "largely turned right around backwards." On
page 188, "The institutional decision has turned out to be a might hardy
animal." If some of the elegance of classical writing is sacrificed to this
mode of expression, interest to students does not suffer.
The author deals with the topics of administrative law that have
become standard since the subject took form in the late 1930's. His strong
views permeate the book. He has clear judgments on almost all contro-
versial issues, and he expresses them vigorously and effectively. His treat-
ment, however, is lot dogmatic; for he recognizes and respects opposing
points of view, even while striking them down. On the whole he defends the
utility and soundness of the characteristic pattern of agency organization
1 Kenneth C. 0. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise. West Publishing Co., 1958.
2 See § 19.04, taking cognizance of San Diego Building Trades Council v. Sarmon,
359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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and procedure today, especially the institutional decision, even while he
deplores such phenomena as the "ineffective regulatory agency, which often
goes through the motions of regulating, thereby silencing the sponsors of
the legislation that brought the agency into existence," but at the same time
"is careful for the most part to regulate in the interest of the regulated,
thereby silencing them."' 3 He also calls for simple, readily available methods
of judicial review, and for review of adequate scope, to guide agency per-
formance and serve as a safeguard against abuse.
The chief target of Professor Davis's criticism, far exceeding in
prominence the decisions with which he disagrees, is the contradictions of
reasoning that have emerged in Supreme Court opinions on important issues
of administrative law, subjecting practitioners and the lower courts to con-
flicting generalizations from on high. It is so as respects, among other
subjects, delegation of legislative power,4 exhaustion of administrative rem-
edies,5 ripeness for review,6 "standing" to secure review,7 and mandatory
judicial relief from administrative action." In the preface to his Treatise he
articulates the standards of judicial performance which he thinks should be
observed, especially abstention from "easy generalizations" that are almost
necessarily ignored or augmented by others, or spuriously distinguished, in
subsequent cases. His points are generally sound and supply needed critical
judgments of judicial performance; yet the scholar is perhaps under an
obligation to sense underlying factors and supply insight to the Court,
subject to pressures it cannot escape, has left unexpressed from time to
time. To some extent Professor Davis supplies such insights,9 even while
condemning the Court for not expressing its true reasons for decision. In
less mellow mood, he makes much at one point' ° of the inconsistency between
Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill" and Moser v. United States,'
12
holding, respectively, that the Government is not estopped and that it is
estopped by failure to bring home to an affected party a clearly applicable
rule of law operating to his disadvantage. The two decisions are indeed
contradictory and difficult or impossible to reconcile logically, and the
Court made no effort to square the later one with the earlier. Yet the facts
and the human considerations in the two cases are utterly different. Whether
one agrees with the results or not, one can rather easily recognize the
practical factors that moved the Court in each instance, and suggest with
at least tolerable assurance the possible course of future decisions, even if
the Court failed to supply an explicit guide.
Basic to Prof. Davis's argument at several points is the distinction he
3 P. 18.
4 §§ 2.02-2.06.
5 §§ 20.01-20.07.
6 Ch. 21.
7 Ch. 22.
8 §§ 23.09-23.12.
9 See, for example, pp. 360-365, explaining the probable reasons for various decisions
on the necessity of exhausting administrative remedies.
1o Pp. 309-312.
11 332 U.S. 380 (1947).
12 341 U.S. 41 (1951).
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draws between "legislative" and "adjudicative" facts, upon which he bases
his conclusions on a series of points, such as whether a trial-type hearing is
required before an agency when facts are in dispute, 1 3 and whether extra-
record facts may be used.' 4 This classification of facts is highly useful and
perhaps serves as well as any distinction could as a foundation for reasoning
to settle a range of procedural problems. Yet it is far from adequate in
itself and needs supplementation for the solution of some issues which
Professor Davis apparently thinks it settles. It seems extreme, for example,
to say that "Legislative facts are ordinarily general and do not concern the
immediate parties."' 5 When a record-type hearing is secured by statute and
the basic issues are legislative, such as the content of a food standard under
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act or the need for new transportation to
serve the public convenience and necessity, the immediate parties may
feel a strong interest which the legislature has in effect recognized for
procedural purposes. Contrariwise, reasons of tradition and of practical
administration may call for procedural freedom, at least as a matter of
constitutional due process, in situations of vital importance primarily to an
individual; and it seems extreme to condemn the Supreme Court for not
reducing to complete doctrinal consistency the due process requirements
for procedure in determining criminal sentences and that for the administra-
tive determination of matters of somewhat lesser moment.' 6
But these matters, involving differences of judgment, do not detract
from the superb treatment which Professor Davis gives to many of the
outstanding issues of administrative law, upon which his insights, applied
to his knowledge, produce definitive essays. Among the outstanding portions
of the Text are those which elucidate the significance and effect of legislative
and interpretative rules,'17 the place of institutional decisions and the desirability
of separation of functions,' 8 the law of evidence in administrative proceedings,' 9
and the principles of primary jurisdiction. 20 In the last of these passages,
incidentally, as well as elsewhere in the Text, Professor Davis gives credit
to the Supreme Court for what he regards as sound and consistent decisions.
All in all this student Text and its companion works2' constitute one
of the handful of truly major achievements of American legal scholarship
during the present century. The legal profession, legal education, and the
cause of better government are deeply in debt to Professor Davis for -the
ability and the years of dedicated labor he has devoted to his self-imposed
task of producing these books.
RALPH F. FUCHS*
13 §§ 7.02, 7.06.
'4 § 15.03.
15 P. 272.
16 Pp. 270-275.
17 §§ 5.03-5.10.
18 Chs. 11-13.
19 Ch. 14.
20 Ch. 19.
21 These include not only the Treatise but recent casebooks for law school and
political science courses in administrative law.
* Professor of'Law, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington, Indiana.
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